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KIM HO MA v. RENO: CLOAKING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
AS CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE
Matthew E. Hedberg
Abstract- In Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, the Ninth Circuit rewrote the plain language of
§ 241(a)(6) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) to avoid a constitutional defect in the statute. Section 123 1(a)(6) of Title 8 of the
U.S. Code, which codifies § 241(a)(6) of the IIRIRA, authorizes the Attorney General to
detain criminal aliens, or removable aliens posing a danger to the community or a danger of
flight risk, beyond the statutory removal period if they have not been removed from the
country. Under the guise of constitutional avoidance, the Ma court carved out an exception to
this detention authority by prohibiting the Attorney General from detaining deportable aliens
beyond the statutory removal period if the aliens' removal will not be accomplished in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Although courts may use the constitutional-avoidance canon of
statutory interpretation to avoid substantial constitutional questions, courts may not rely on
the canon when the statutory language and legislative intent are clear. The Ma court's
statutory interpretation cannot be squared with either the plain language or the congressional
intent of § 1236(a)(6) that the Attorney General's detention authority includes the discretion
to determine which criminal aliens may be released back into the community pending removal
from the United States.

Court watchers bustled with anticipation as the Ninth Circuit took up
the case of Kim Ho Ma v. Reno.' The constitutionality of indefinite
detention of immigrants under the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)2 was finally having its
day in court. For hundreds of aliens detained pending deportation, this
case marked the chance for constitutional redemption. For the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), this was the opportunity
to receive judicial recognition of the constitutionality of its actions in
carrying out the country's immigration policies. Yet, the Ninth Circuit
ducked the issue and cloaked its activist decision in the chameleon-like
legitimacy of constitutional avoidance.
Because indefinite detention is an important issue in this country's
immigration policy, courts need to confront directly the constitutional
requirements for detention of the hundreds of aliens awaiting deportation
from this country.3 In Ma, the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to
1. 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
3. Compare Elizabeth Larson Beyer, Comment, A Right or a Privilege:ConstitutionalProtection
for Detained Deportable Aliens Refused Access or Return to Their Native Countries, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1031-32 (2000) (arguing that indefinite detention is limited by constitutional

Washington Law Review

Vol. 76:669, 2001

address this facet of the United States's immigration policy but
unfortunately chose to dodge the question under the shroud of constitutional avoidance. Constitutional avoidance is appropriately used to
interpret ambiguous statutes in such a way that avoids deciding a
substantial constitutional question, so long as the statutory construction is
not plainly contrary to congressional intent. Ma did not present a case
susceptible to interpretation using constitutional avoidance because the
IIRIRA clearly permits a post-removal-period detention of criminal
aliens found to pose a threat of danger or flight.
This Note argues the Ma court misconstrued the IIRIRA by carving
out an exception to the Attorney General's detention authority. Part I
reviews the detention and removal of aliens under this country's
immigration laws. Part II explores the background of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 and case law interpreting its provision
authorizing the Attorney General to detain aliens. Part III explains
canons of statutory interpretation in immigration law, including the
canon of constitutional avoidance. Part IV analyzes the facts, procedural
history, reasoning, and holding in Ma v. Reno. Finally, Part V argues that
the Ninth Circuit incorrectly used constitutional avoidance to create a
judicially crafted time limit, stretching the federal detention statute far
beyond its original meaning. The Ninth Circuit's approach is unfortunate
because it encroaches on Congress's lawmaking authority and abdicates
the judiciary's role in striking down statutes that violate the Constitution.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DETENTION AND REMOVAL OF
ALIENS

The INA authorizes the Attorney General4 to detain both deportable
and excludable aliens pending removal from the United States.' Aliens in
the United States may be removed-sent back to their countries of
origin-for committing designated crimes. 6 The deportability of an alien
is determined in removal proceedings conducted by immigration judges
restraints), with Daniel R. Dinger, Comment, When We Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain?: An
Analysis ofthe Rights qfDeportableAliens Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim
Procedures Governing Detention, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1551, 1595-96 (arguing that indefinite
detention is constitutional and necessary in immigration law).
4. The Attorney General's statutory authority is delegated to Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) District Directors, but this Note will refer to the Attorney General for purposes of
discussing the IIRIRA's detention authority. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (Supp. V 1999).
6. Id. § 1227(a)(2).
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and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in accordance with
regulations of the Attorney General.' After an immigration judge has
ordered an alien removed from the United States, the alien is taken into
INS custody for a ninety-day "removal period" during which time
removal should occur.' Detention during the ninety-day removal period
is mandatory for aggravated felons.' Criminal aliens or other aliens
posing a risk of community danger or flight, who are not removed during
the removal period,'0 may be subject to indefinite detention while
awaiting removal." At the beginning of 2001, there were approximately
were being detained while awaiting
5000 aliens in INS detention who
2
removal from the United States.'
Courts have interpreted the scope of the Attorney General's detention
and removal authority to vary depending on whether the alien is
"excludable" or "deportable."' 3 Excludable aliens are aliens who have
not been lawfully admitted into the United States. 4 Under the "entry
fiction,"' 5 the Attorney General often grants excludable aliens "parole,"
allowing them physically to enter the United States pending removal to
their countries of origin without lawfully admitting them into the United
States.' 6 Deportable aliens, on the other hand, have been lawfully
admitted into the United States as resident aliens but at the time of
deportation have not naturalized into the country. 7 Courts have generally
held that excludable aliens have no constitutional rights to be free from
indefinite detention pending removal.' Conversely, courts have disagreed over the extent of constitutional rights possessed by deportable

7. Id. §§ 1228, 1229a; 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.0-.65 (2000).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(1)(A).

9. Id. § 1231(a)(2).
10. There are numerous reasons why an alien may not be removed during the ninety-day removal
period, including the absence of a repatriation agreement. A repatriation agreement enables a
country to return aliens who have been ordered removed to their country of citizenship, provided that
country is party to the agreement. See, e.g., Dinger,supra note 3,at 1552 n.14.
11. 8 U.S.C.§ 1231(a)(6).
12. Lise Olsen, Seattle "Lifer' Has His Day in Highest Court, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.
13. See Dinger,supra note 3, at 1558-59.
14. 8 U.S.C.§ 1182.
15. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953) (summarizing history
of entry fiction).
16. Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 961 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
18. Shaughnessy,345 U.S. at 215.
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aliens.' 9 Despite the constitutional implications that flow from an alien's
status as deportable or excludable, immigration law now subjects all
aliens ordered removed to the same statutory detention provision.2"
II.

DETENTION OF ALIENS ORDERED REMOVED UNDER THE
INA

Immigration law regulating the detention and removal of aliens has
undergone many changes over the years. Immigration law has evolved
from court-imposed time limits to Attorney General discretion over alien
detention. The statutory and legislative history and court decisions

interpreting the current detention statute demonstrate a policy favoring
detention of aliens awaiting removal, tempered only by Attorney General
discretion. As the statutory amendments to the INA reveal, Congress
authorized, if not required, the Attorney General to detain aggravated
felons until removal is accomplished.
A.

Statutory History of the INA

The INA,2 ' which governs the deportability of aliens, is a patchwork
of legislation that has undergone numerous revisions. Before 1952, the
Immigration Act of 191722 governed the detention of aliens subject to a
final order of deportation. 23 Under the 1917 Act, Congress established no
time limit for accomplishing deportation; rather, the Attorney General
continued to detain deportable aliens not released on bond until
deportation was accomplished. 4 In several cases where aliens could not
19. Compare Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279,297 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that deportable
alien has no greater rights than excludable alien), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000), with
Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that deportable alien's
right to substantive due process is not extinguished by final deportation order).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (providing that aliens who are inadmissible to United States under
§ 1182 or deportable under § 1227 may be detained beyond ninety-day removal period). IIRIRA
§ 301, 110 Stat. 3009-575 to -579 (1996), amended the INA to refer to "excludable" aliens as
"inadmissible" aliens, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1225, and established "removal" proceedings to take
the place of "deportation" and "exclusion" proceedings, e.g., § 1229a. Because courts continue to
use the "excludable" and "deportable" terminology, this Note will refer to aliens as excludable or
deportable depending on their immigration status.
21. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537.
22. An Act To Regulate the Immigration of Aliens to, and the Residence of Aliens in, the United
States, Pub. L. No. 301, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 156 (1917))
(repealed 1952).
23. Id. §§ 19 ,2 0, 21,39 Stat. 889-91.
24. Id. § 19,39 Stat. 889.

Kim Ho Ma v. Reno
be deported for various reasons, the Ninth Circuit imposed a "reasonable
time" limitation on detention that generally did not extend longer than
four months."
In 1952, Congress amended the provisions of the INA governing the
Attorney General's detention of aliens subject to deportation.26 As
codified, the 1952 amendments granted the Attorney General authority to
carry out an alien's deportation within six months following a final order
of deportation.2 ' At the discretion of the Attorney General, the alien
could either be detained or released during the six-month period."
Federal courts strictly interpreted the six-month time limit as prohibiting
any detention of deportable aliens beyond six months.2 9
The court-imposed six-month limit on detention remained in effect
until 1990, when Congress barred the release of aggravated felons, with
limited exceptions, under final orders of deportation. 30 The 1990
amendment made clear that mandatory detention of aggravated felons
was required both while deportation proceedings were pending and after
3
a final order of deportation, despite the former six-month limit. '
Congress also included an exception to the mandatory-detention
provision that allowed the Attorney General to release on bond aggravated felons lawfully admitted for permanent residence3 2 after a
determination that the alien was not a threat to the community and was
likely to appear for immigration hearings.33 Thus, for the first time, the
Attorney General had the authority to detain certain aliens beyond a set
removal period.
In 1996, Congress closed the door even tighter on detained aliens
awaiting removal by amending the INA with the Antiterrorism and

25. See, e.g., Wolck v. Weedin, 58 F.2d 928, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1932); Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53
F.2d 13, 16 (9th Cir. 1931); Caranica v. Nagle, 28 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1928); see also United
States exrel.Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401,403-04 (2d Cir. 1922).
26. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 166 (amended 1990)
(former 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1952)) [hereinafter INA).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c), (d) (1982) (amended 1996).

28. Id. § 1252(c).
29. See, e.g., Johns v. Dep't of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 890 (5th Cir. 1981); Castillo-Gradis v.
Tumage, 752 F. Supp. 937, 941 (S.D. Cal. 1990); cf.Oguachuba v. INS, 706 F.2d 93, 96 (2d Cir.
1983).
30. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 504(a), 104 Stat. 5049
(amended 1996) (former 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) & (B) (Supp. I 1990)).
31. Id.

32 Id.
33. Id.
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).34 The AEDPA required
the Attorney General to take into custody an expanded category of
criminal aliens subject to mandatory detention." Significantly, the
amendment repealed a 1952 statute that had permitted the Attorney
General to release criminal aliens, including lawfully admitted aliens
who were determined to pose no threat of danger to the community or
danger of flight.3 6 Thus, after the AEDPA, the Attorney General had no
discretion to release any aggravated felon from detention. Five months
later, Congress again revised the INA's detention provisions through the
IIRIRA, 3 which restored the Attorney General's discretionary relief.
Rather than mandating detention following the removal period, the
IIRIRA permits the Attorney General to release criminal aliens who
satisfy specified statutory requirements. 8
B.

Legislative History of the HRIRA

The legislative history of the IIRIRA illustrates a compromise
between mandating detention of criminal aliens and increasing the
Attorney General's discretion to make detention determinations. When
reviewing legislative proposals to amend the INA, Congress aimed to
ensure that aliens ordered removed did not return to their communities.3 9
Congress considered several different approaches to reform the removal
of illegal and criminal aliens.4"
The House of Representatives originally considered House Bill 1915,
which called for stricter standards governing the release of aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies during and after removal proceedings."
The bill's provisions required mandatory detention during the removal
34. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
35. Id.
36. Id. (repealing INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 66 Stat. 208 (1952) (former 8 U.S.C. § 1252)).
37. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
Sections of 8 U.S.C.). This amendment transferred the provisions regarding detention of criminal
aliens under final orders of removal from 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (1994) (as amended by AEDPA) to
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (Supp. V 1999). Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 305,306, 110 Stat. 3009-598,3009-607
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (Supp. V 1999)).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) (Supp. V 1999). The IIRIRA established transition-period custody rules
governing detention pending removal, which were in effect for the two-year period ending October
1998. IIRIRA § 303(b)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-586 to -587 (1996).
39. H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 107-08 (1997).
40. Id. at 105.
41. H.R. 1915, 104th Cong. § 300(3) (1995).
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period, but called for the mandatory release of deportable aliens not
removed following the removal period.42 Providing the impetus for
House Bill 1915 was a report from the Inspector General of the Department of Justice that found that the vast majority of aliens not detained
following deportation proceedings absconded and were not removed
from the United States, while detention facilitated removal.43 The stated
purpose of the statutory reform was to eliminate the incidence of aliens
absconding after deportation proceedings" by increasing the detention of
aliens who are ordered removed.4 5
The bill that ultimately became the IIRIRA-House Bill 2202 4 6 -was
introduced to the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee on
August 4, 1995, in place of House Bill 1915." 7 House Bill 2202 contained
the same detention provisions that were in House Bill 1915.48 Moreover,
the Committee Report explained that, in order to ensure a criminal alien
is removed from the country, detention following entry of a final order of
removal was necessary. 49 The House of Representatives subsequently
passed the bill on March 21, 1996. o
Meanwhile, on April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the AEDPA. 1
During a floor debate on June 7, 1995, Senator Kennedy criticized the
Senate Bill that later became the AEDPA because the Bill required the
Attorney General detain the expanded class of criminal aliens even when
those aliens could not be returned to their home countries. 2 Despite the
criticism, the AEDPA was enacted into law.53 After enactment of the
AEDPA, INS General Counsel David Martin testified on behalf of the
Department of Justice before a subcommittee of the House of
Representatives regarding the problems the INS was having under the
AEDPA. He called for restoration of the Attorney General's discretion to
42. Id. § 305(3) (providing that inadmissible aliens were subject to continued detention following
removal period).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 104-879, at 108.
44. Id. at 107.
45. Id.
46. H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1995).
47. H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 118.
48. H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1,at 18-19,25-26,234 (1996).
49. Id. at 160-61.
50. H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 121.
51. The AEDPA originated from Senate Bill 735,104th Cong. (1995). See supranotes 34-36 and
accompanying text.
52. 141 CONG. REc. 15,068 (1995).
53. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(c), 110 Stat. 1277.
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release aliens "who cannot, despite INS's best efforts, be removedprovided they meet the earlier tests regarding dangerousness and flight
risk."54 He also informed Congress that even with restored Attorney
General discretion, the INS "fully intends to hold in custody, for as long
as necessary, those [removable aliens] who are dangerous to the
community."55
With the impetus for immigration reform renewed in Congress, the
Senate passed House Bill 2202 on May 2, 1996.56 Originally, the Senate
version of the IIRIRA had similar provisions as the AEDPA. The
original Senate version expanded the class of deportable criminal aliens
subject to mandatory detention, while simultaneously restricting the
Attorney General's release authority. 7 In conference, however, the
Senate and House compromised on the different versions. 8 As a result of
the conference modifications, detention beyond the removal period was
made discretionary, not mandatory. 9 In addition, the conference modifications yielded the provision allowing for detention of deportable
aliens beyond the removal period if the Attorney General determined that
the alien posed a risk to the community or was likely to abscond before
removal if released.6" The Senate and the House finally reached
agreement on the Conference Report and the IIRIRA was signed into law
on September 30, 1996.6!
C.

The JIRIRA Detention Statute: 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)

The most disputed portion of the IIRIRA amendments to the INA is
§ 123 1(a)(6) of Title 8 of the United States Code.62 Section 123 1(a)(6)
governs the detention beyond the removal period of excludable and
deportable aliens ordered removed from the country.63 The language of
54. Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Claims ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15 (1996) (statement of David A. Martin,
INS General Counsel).
55. Id.
56. In passing House Bill 2202, the Senate substituted the text ofanother Senate immigration bill.
S. 1664, 104th Cong. (1996).
57. S. 1664, 104th Cong. § 164 (1996).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 210-11,215-16 (1996).
Id. at 53-54,215-16.
Id. at 54,215-16.
H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 122 (1997).
INA § 241(a)(6) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1999)).
8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (Supp. V 1999).
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§ 1231(a)(6) explicitly provides for a post-removal-period detention of
criminal aliens. Courts have divided on the permissible duration of
detention beyond the removal period.
The IIRIRA amendments to the INA mandate that, following a final
order of removal, the Attorney General must detain certain aliens,
including aggravated felons,6' during a removal period of ninety days.6'
The ninety-day removal period marks a shift from the former six-month
removal period under the 1952 amendments to the INA.' If removal
cannot be accomplished during the removal period, § 1231(a)(6)
preserves the Attorney General's authority to detain aggravated felons
thereafter by specifying that aliens "may be detained beyond the removal
period." 67 Unlike the AEDPA mandatory detention regime, Congress
granted the Attorney General discretion to decide whether to detain
aliens for an unspecified period of time beyond the ninety-day removal
period. 8
Regulations implementing the IIRIRA allow the Attorney General to
delegate the discretionary release power to INS District Directors. 69 INS
District Directors consider nine non-exclusive factors in determining
whether to exercise the discretionary release authority or maintain the
alien in custody.7" According to the implementing regulations, aliens
seeking release carry the burden of demonstrating that release from
custody will not pose a danger to the community or flight risk.7' Section
123 l(a)(6) is in line with the trend of bestowing on the Attorney General
the authority to make individualized determinations of who will be

64. Id. § 123 1(a)(2).
65. Id.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A).
66. Compare former INA § 242(a)(2)(C) (amended 1996) (six months), with INA § 241(a)(1)
(ninety days).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (emphasis added). The section provides:
An alien ordered removed [who is excludable or deportable based on criminal grounds,] ... or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to
comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released,
shall be subject to [supervision].
Id.
68. Id.
69. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 236.1(d)(2)(ii) (2000).
70. Id.
§ 241.4(a)(l)-(9).
71. Id.
§ 241.4(a).
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subject to continued detention based on community safety and flight
risk.72
D.

Cases Interpretingthe Attorney General'sDetention Authority
Under§ 1231(a)(6)

The overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the issue
have interpreted the language of § 1231 (a)(6) as explicitly authorizing
the Attorney General to detain deportable aliens beyond the ninety-day
removal period.73 Representative of these courts' decisions is Duy Dac
Ho v. Greene.74 In Ho, the Tenth Circuit found that § 1231 (a)(6) "is not
ambiguous," and "places no time limit" on the Attorney General's
authority to detain aliens beyond the ninety-day removal period. 75 The
Tenth Circuit refused to read a time limit into the statute because to do so
would override Congress's will as expressed in the plain language of the
statute.7 6 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that by expressly declining to limit
the Attorney General's detention authority in § 1231(a)(6), Congress
unambiguously authorized the Attorney General to detain indefinitely
beyond the removal period certain removable aliens who cannot be
removed within the removal period."
The Fifth Circuit, in Zadvydas v. Underdown,78 also upheld the
continued detention of a deportable alien whose deportation was
indefinitely delayed pending acceptance by another country.79 The court
72. See generally id. §§ 241. 1-.33 (providing regulations governing post-hearing detention and
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6)).
73. See, e.g., Michel v. INS, 119 F. Supp. 2d 485, 492 (M.D. Pa. 2000); Duong v. INS, 118 F.
Supp. 2d 1059, 1067 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Cuesta Martinez v. INS, 97 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (M.D. Pa.
2000); Kay v. Reno, 94 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548-49 (M.D. Pa. 2000); Sivilay Sengchanh v. Lanier, 89
F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099,
1108 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Villafterte v. INS, 71 F. Supp. 2d 573,576-77 (W.D. La. 1999); Thien Van
Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1286-87 (D. Colo. 1999); Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d
1149, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (D.R.I.
1999); Cholak v. United States, No. 98-365, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424, at *18-21 (E.D. La. May
15, 1998); Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1025 (E.D. La. 1997), rev'd sub noa.
Zadvydas v. Underwood, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000).
74. 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000).
75. Id. at 1056-57.
76. Id. at 1057.
77. Id. After concluding that the Attorney General possesses the authority under § 1231 (a)(6) to
indefinitely detain deportable aliens pending removal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the alien's due
process claims. Id. at 1059-60.
78. 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000).
79. See id. at 287, 291.
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did not question the district court's holding that Congress clearly would
have placed a time limit on the period of detention if it had so intended
and, therefore, the continued detention of a deportable alien was
consistent with the Attorney General's statutory authority.80 The court of
appeals upheld the finding that mandatory detention language coupled
with the absence of a time limit on detention necessarily means that
indefinite detention is authorized." These cases are representative of
other courts' decisions that § 1231(a)(6) explicitly authorizes postremoval-period detention of deportable aliens. 2
I.

APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Courts employ a number of methods when interpreting statutes. Chief
among the statutory interpretation tools is the plain-meaning approach,
whereby courts seek to give full effect to the statutory language. Where
the statutory language is ambiguous, courts will construe statutes in such
a way that avoids deciding substantial constitutional questions. Additionally, as a result of congressional and executive plenary power over
immigration law, courts will defer to the reasonable statutory
interpretation made by those coordinate branches of the government.
Finally, courts seek to give statutes their intended effect by supplying
meaning to each statutory word and refusing to render any part of a
statute superfluous.
A.

The TraditionalApproach to Statutory Construction:The PlainMeaning Rule

Statutory construction necessitates a full accounting of a statute's
text.83 When interpreting statutes, courts attempt to bring to fruition the
intent of the enacting legislative body.84 Although determining intent is

80. Id.; Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1025 (E.D. La. 1997), rev'd sub nom.
Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (Sth Cir. 1999), cert.granted,121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000).
81. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. at 1025. Though it found indefinite detention to be statutorily
authorized, the district court ultimately held that the alien's detention violated his constitutional right
to due process. Id. at 1027. The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the substantive due process

challenge to the alien's detention. Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 296-97.
8Z See supra note 73.
83. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,454-55 (1993).
84. See Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:DippingInto Legislative History, I1 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1125, 1125-26 (1983).

679
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often difficult,85 courts generally regard the plain meaning of the statute's
language as the primary indicia of intent.8 6 Only if the statute's plain
meaning is ambiguous do courts look to the statute's history, underlying
policy, structure, and other canons of statutory interpretation.87
Moreover, abiding by the plain-meaning rule necessarily means that
courts should not alter a statute by reading words or elements into the
statutory language that are not present on its face.88
The plain meaning of the statutory language guides a court's approach
to statutory construction unless legislative history clearly dictates a
different result. 89 The underlying goal of this approach is to respect and
enforce the plain meaning of the entire language composition in the
statute, including underlying policy. 90 To this end, the U.S. Supreme
Court has cautioned that when interpreting statutes, courts are bound by
the purpose Congress sought to achieve and the means it has selected in
carrying out that purpose. 9' The fact that the plain language of a statute
appears to produce harsh results is not an invitation for courts to redraft
the statute. 92 Furthermore, in the specific context of immigration law, the
Ninth Circuit has previously held that where the plain meaning of the
statute is unambiguous, that meaning is to be given full effect.93
B.

The Canon of ConstitutionalAvoidance

Among the judicial tools used to interpret statutes is the canon of
constitutional avoidance. 94 This canon seeks to prevent interpreting

85. Id.
86. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321,340-41 (1990).
87. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1494
(1987).
88. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997).
89. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990).
90. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000).
91. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4 (1994); see also Daniel
A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 292 (1989)
("When statutory language and legislative intent are unambiguous, courts may not take action to the
contrary.").
92. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 91, 95 (1985) (holding that mining claims had been
extinguished because claimants recorded their claims on December 31 instead of "prior" to
December 31).
93. Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1997).
94. For a discussion on the U.S. Supreme Court's historical use of the canon of constitutional
avoidance, see Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions,85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948 (1997).
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ambiguous statutes in ways that would create constitutional infirmity."
Constitutional avoidance is founded on the prudential concern that
constitutional issues should only be addressed when necessary and that
because Congress is bound by its duty to uphold the Constitution, courts
should presume that legislative enactments adhere to constitutional
mandates. 96
Constitutional avoidance is used to avoid substantial constitutional
questions only when the plain language97 of the statute or congressional
intent is ambiguous. 98 When the plain language of a statute collides with
the Constitution, constitutional avoidance cannot save the statute. 99 The
U.S. Supreme Court has warned that the constitutional-avoidance canon
"is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the
legislature,"' 00 and "disingenuous" attempts to avoid a constitutional
question are impermissible.' 0' In United States v. Locke, 2 the Court
eschewed the use of constitutional avoidance and confronted the
constitutional question head-on because to do otherwise would contort
the statute to the point of "disingenuous evasion."' 3
C.

JudicialDeference to Executive Branch Statutory Interpretationin
ImmigrationLaw

1.

GeneralTenets ofJudicialDeference

When interpreting a statute that is silent or ambiguous, the role of the
judiciary is not to impose its interpretation of a statute over that of
another governmental branch's reasonable interpretation, especially in an

95. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,

575 (1988).
96. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1999).

97. DeBartolo,485 U.S. at 575.
98. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327,336 (2000).
99. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 177 (2d Cir. 1997).

100. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985).
101. George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373,379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) ("Avoidance

of a [constitutional question] will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion .... [When
Congress's intent is clear, t]he problem must be faced and answered.").
102. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
103. Id. at 96, 110 (holding that due process was not violated when holders of unpatented mining
claims who failed to comply with annual filing requirements forfeited their claims); see Ernest A.
Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the PreservationofJudicialReview, 78

TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2000) (noting criticism of constitutional avoidance for ignoring
congressional intent).
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area that the coordinate branch is entrusted to administer °4 Moreover,
when Congress is aware of the executive's interpretation of a statute and
does not alter this interpretation, while amending other portions of the
same statute, courts infer that the executive's interpretation is consistent
with congressional intent and thus warrants judicial deference.'0 5
When deciding whether to defer to an executive agency's interpretation of a statute, a court's first step is to determine whether Congress
has expressed its intent on the issue. 6 If Congress has, "that is the end of
the matter," and both courts and agencies must defer to congressional
intent. 107 Courts employ the "traditional tools" used for interpreting the
plain meaning of statutes in determining legislative intent for purposes of
this inquiry.0 8
If Congress has not directly expressed its intent on the question at
issue, courts may not impose their own statutory interpretation over an
agency's reasonable interpretation.0 9 Pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.," 0 courts seek to avoid the
danger of venturing into areas of agency expertise, to which they owe
special deference. "1 Judicial deference is justified because agencies are
in a better position than the courts to handle the exigencies of competing
policy choices dealing with the public interest." 2 Deference is also
justified because of the agency's greater familiarity with the everchanging facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects regulated." 3
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that when given the choice
between competing statutory interpretations, an agency's statutory interpretation that is reasonable in light of conflicting policies warrants
judicial deference unless the agency's accommodation is clearly contrary
to congressional intent.'

104. Aragon-Ayon v. INS, 206 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2000).
105. Greenhorn Farms v. Espy, 39 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1994).
106. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
107. Id. at 842-43.
108. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,447-48 (1987); see supra Part 11.A.
109. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see Oren Eisner, Extending Chevron Deference to Presidential
Interpretations of Ambiguities in Foreign Affairs and National Security Statutes Delegating
Lawmaking Power to the President,86 CORNELL L. REv. 411,411-13 (2001).
110. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
111. Id. at 844.
112. Id. at 866.
113. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991).
114. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45.
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2.

JudicialDeference in Immigration Law

Case law interpreting the scope of the government's immigration
power recognizes the authority of the political branches to craft broad
policy decisions over all matters relating to admission, exclusion, and
deportation of aliens, subject only to limited judicial review." 5 The U.S.
Supreme Court has long recognized that the political branches generally
enjoy broad power over immigration," 6 including the "power to expel or
exclude aliens.""' 7 One rationale for this recognition is that the executive
branch is especially entitled to judicial deference in the immigration
context, where sensitive foreign relations questions are implicated."' In
the specific context of the IRIRA, the Court has found that many of the
Act's provisions are "aimed at protecting the Executive's discretion from
the courts-indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the
legislation.""..9 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that,
despite the seemingly severe result, executive action increasing the
burden needed to stay a removal order was consistent with the policy
goals of the IIRIRA to vest the Attorney General with broad discretion in
carrying out the country's immigration policy. 20
The Ninth Circuit has also interpreted Congress's lack of restraint on
the Attorney General's detention authority to require that courts defer to
the Attorney General's decision to prolong detention for excludable
aliens. In Barrera-Echavarriav. Rison, 121 the Ninth Circuit refused to
read a time limit into a detention statute that did not explicitly provide
for the authority to detain indefinitely." The court based its decision on
the fact that Congress was aware of the impediments to removal for some
aliens yet refused to restrict the Attorney General's detention authority.'
In fact, that panel examined the interplay of the INA's various sections
and held that in the absence of a statutory limitation "the statutory
115. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
116. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889).
117. Shaughnessy v. United States exreL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,210 (1953).
118. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,425 (1999).
119. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1999)
(upholding IIRIRA's provision insulating Attomey General's decisions under INA from judicial
review).
120. Andreiu v. Reno, 223 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000).
121. 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995).
122. Id. (analyzing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 1225(b), 1226,, 1227(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V

1993)).
123. Id.at 1446.
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scheme implicitly authorizes prolonged detention."' 24 The BarreraEchavarria court attributed its construction, in part, to the deference
owed the Attorney General's interpretation. 12' Nearly every circuit court
26
to reach the issue has agreed with the result in Barrera-Echavarria.
In immigration law, the "plenary power" doctrine provides another
source of judicial deference to the legislative and executive branches.
Plenary power over immigration enables congressional and executive
flexibility in adjusting policy choices to changing political and economic
circumstances.' 27 The U.S. Supreme Court adheres to the guideline that
when a collateral branch of government has plenary power over an issue,
courts must defer to the exercise of that authority so long as the bounds
of the Constitution are not transgressed.' 28 Both the Third and Fifth
Circuits have emphasized that the government's plenary power over
immigration renders it "largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference."' 129 Thus, absent a finding of constitutional violation, courts
overturn proper exercises of plenary power in the immigration
should not
30
1
context.
D.

PresumptionAgainst Superfluous Language in Statutes

Courts presume that every provision in a statute is intended to have
independent effect.' 3 ' Courts seek to construe statutes so that the
language Congress selected is not weakened through a construction that
would render any word void or superfluous.132 Instead, courts seek to
124. Id. (discussing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 1227(a)(1) (1998 & Supp. V 1993)). The court
refused to recognize a constitutional right to release in part by finding that "indefinite" detention was
not implicated due to the periodic INS review of the alien's detention. Id. at 1450.
the Ninth Circuit also relied on the "entry fiction" in
125. Id. at 1444-48. In Barrera-Echavarria,
upholding the constitutionality of indefinite detention of excludable aliens. Id. at 1450; see also
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g.,
Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1997); Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney
General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1446, amended by 997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993); Femandez-Roque v.
Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (1 lthCir. 1984); Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103-04 (4th Cir.
1982).
127. Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
128. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983).
129. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 289 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297
(Oct. 10, 2000) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)); see also Chi Thon
Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 395-96 (3d Cir. 1999).
130. See Chadha,462 U.S. at 941.
131. DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, 706 F. Supp. 1479, 1495 (M.D. Fla.
1989), aft'd, 888 F.2d 766 (11 th Cir. 1989).
132. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882).
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adhere to the basic principle that each statutory word should, if possible,
be read to preserve its operative effect in the statutory scheme."' This
presumption against surplusage helps to ensure that Congress's intent is
fully realized. For example, in Ratzlaf v. United States,3 4 the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that essentially read one
word out of the statute.'35 In Ratzlaf, the court of appeals erroneously
treated the "willfulness" requirement in a criminal statute as of no
consequence.'3 6 As the Court noted, "[]udges should hesitate.., to treat
statutory terms [as surplusage] in any setting."'3a Similarly, in Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., 38 the Court held that courts should avoid interpreting a
statute in a way that "renders some words altogether redundant.' ' 39 In
Gustafson, the Court avoided interpreting the word "communication" in
the Securities Act of 1933 in such a way that would effectively render
other terms in the statute redundant and eliminate their meaning within
the statute. 4 Instead, the Gustafson Court held that the statute must be
read in its entirety, thereby giving
effect to the language Congress
4
intended to include in the statute.1 1
IV. KJMHO MAv. RENO
In Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 142 the Ninth Circuit was asked to construe the
IIRIRA's detention provision. The District Court for the Western District
of Washington, while not questioning that § 1231(a)(6) authorized the
continued detention of aliens, had held that indefinite detention violated
the substantive due process rights of deportable aliens. In contrast, the
court of appeals did not reach the constitutional grounds but determined
that the Attorney General lacked authority under § 123 1(a)(6) to detain
deportable aliens beyond the removal period if removal will not occur in
a "reasonable time."' 43

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
510 U.S. 135 (1994).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 140.
Id.
513 U.S. 561 (1995).

139. Id. at 574.
140. Id.

141. Id. at 574-75.
142. 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.), cert.granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000).
143. Id. at 830-31.
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Facts and ProceduralHistory

Kim Ho Ma is a native and citizen of Cambodia.'" He lawfully
entered the United States in 1985 as a refugee and became a lawful
permanent resident in 1987. In 1996, he was convicted in a Washington
state court of first-degree manslaughter as a result of participating in a
as a
gang-related shooting. 145 His conviction made him removable
4 6 alien convicted of an aggravated felony. 47
"deportable"'
Pursuant to Attorney General regulations, the INS took Ma into
custody following his release by state authorities on June 6, 1997.14
Once in custody, the INS commenced removal proceedings against
Ma.' 49 An immigration judge found Ma removable because of his
conviction. 5 Ma appealed this ruling to the BIA, and the BIA affirmed
the immigration judge's decision. 5' The immigration judge concluded
that Ma's detention was authorized under the JIRIRA because he would
be a danger to the community if released.' 52 Ma's order of removal
The final order of removal
became final on October 26, 1998.'
extinguished Ma's status as a lawful permanent resident and any legal
right to remain in the country. '54 Despite the final removal order, the
Attorney General could not remove Ma within the ninety-day period
because the United States had no repatriation agreement with Cambodia. "55 Following the ninety-day removal period, during which Ma's
detention was mandatory,' 56 he was detained pursuant to § 1231 (a)(6). "
Ma filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the con144. See id. at 818.
145. Id. at 819.
146. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
147. Ma, 208 F.3d at 819; see 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(F) (Supp. V 1999) (defining "aggravated
felony" to include crime of violence for which term of imprisonment imposed is one year or more);
Administrative Record at 48, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (C99-15/WD)
148. Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
149. Ma, 208 F.3dat 819.
150. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
151. Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
152. Administrative Record at 41.
153. Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
154. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 819; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(a)(20), (a)(47)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V
1999); 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p) (1999).
155. Ma, 208 F.3d at 819. See supra note 10 for discussion regarding repatriation agreements.
156. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
157. See supra Part II.C.
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stitutionality of his continued detention."' Following an evidentiary
hearing," 9 the district court concluded that continued detention violated
Ma's Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights.' 6 Although the
district court did not dispute that § 1231(a)(6) authorizes continued
detention, it granted Ma's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
September 29, 1999, and ordered his immediate release. 16 ' The INS
appealed the district court judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the district court's judgment. 62
B.

Holdingand Reasoning

Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment
granting Ma habeas corpus relief, the court did not reach the merits of the
district court's due process ruling. The court of appeals noted that the
central issue addressed by the parties' arguments, as well as the basis for
the district court's decision, was indeed the constitutionality of the INS's
detention policy. 63 Yet without either the benefit of briefing by the
parties or consideration by the district court on the statutory question, the
court of appeals based its ruling on a construction of the statute.164 The
court disagreed with the vast majority of other federal courts that
considered the issue' and concluded that because § 123 1(a)(6) does not
specify a time limit for continued detention beyond the removal period, a
"reasonable time" limitation on detention should be read into
§ 1231(a)(6).' 66
The Ma court determined that § 1231(a)(6) was ambiguous with
regard to the length of time detention was authorized beyond the removal
period and that this ambiguity raised a substantial constitutional

158. Administrative Record at 208-14, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (C99-15/WD).
159. Kim Ho Ma v. INS, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (W.D. Wash 1999).
160. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, No. C99-151L (W.D. Wash 1999), afd,208 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000) (granting Ma habeas relief). The court followed a
previously established legal framework, which addressed the substantive and procedural due process
challenges brought by aliens subject to § 1231 (a)(6) detention following final orders of removal. Id.
at 3; see also Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156-58 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
161. Ma, No. C99-151L.
162. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818, 831 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct.

10,2000).
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 820.
See id.
See supranote 73 and accompanying text.
Ma, 208 F.3d at 830.
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question. 167 Specifically, the court reasoned that § 1231 (a)(6) was ambiguous because if Congress had intended to authorize indefinite detention
of deportable aliens, it would have made a "clear statement to that
effect."' 168 Because Ma was a deportable alien entitled to Fifth Amendment due process protection, the court reasoned that this ambiguity might
have constitutional implications. 69 Therefore, the court sought to read
the statute in such a way as to avoid considering the constitutionality of
indefinite detention.170 The Ma court acknowledged that § 1231(a)(6)
7'
was like the similarly worded detention statute in Barrera-Echavarria
in that they both unambiguously authorized the Attorney General to
7
continue detention of certain aliens beyond the removal period.' 1
However, the Ma court tried to distinguish Barrera-Echavarriaas
on the
applicable only to excludable aliens while trying to avoid ruling
73
constitutionality of indefinite detention of deportable aliens.
The court tried to navigate these concerns by applying the
constitutional-avoidance canon and reading into § 1231(a)(6) a reasonable time limitation. The court reasoned that Congress would have
included express language authorizing "indefinite detention" if it had so
intended.' 74 Moreover, the court believed that reading a "reasonable
time" limitation into § 1231(a)(6) was consistent with its earlier
interpretation of the differently worded 1917 Act, despite the unclear
reasoning of earlier cases interpreting the 1917 Act. 17' Although it noted
that the 1917 Act was not exactly like § 123 1(a)(6), the court found the
176
absence of an express time limitation in both statutes analogous.
explained that its interpretation was consistent
Finally, in dicta, the court
77
with international law.1
Despite INS protest to the contrary, the court of appeals concluded
that no reasonable likelihood existed that Ma would be removed to

167. Id. at 821-22, 827.
168. Id. at 822.
169. Id. at 825.
170. Id. at 827.
171. 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995).
44 F.3d at 1445.
172. Ma, 208 F.3d. at 824-25 n.20; see also Barrera-Echavarria,
173. Ma, 208 F.3d. at 824-25, 827.
174. Id. at 828 n.25.
175. Id. at 822, 829; see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
176. Ma, 208 F.3d at 829.
177. Id. at 830 (noting that courts generally construe statutes to avoid violating international laws
that prohibit prolonged and arbitrary detention unless Congress has enacted law to contrary).
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Cambodia.' The court of appeals reasoned that the absence of a
repatriation agreement between the United States and Cambodia
providing for the return of each country's nationals was sufficient proof
to demonstrate that Ma's removal would not occur in the reasonably
foreseeable future.'79 Therefore, the court ruled that the INS could no
longer detain Ma.'°
V.

THE KIM HO MA v. RENO COURT IMPERMISSIBLY
INVOKED THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AVOIDANCE

The Ninth Circuit's holding that the Attorney General's detention
authority under § 1231(a)(6) cannot exceed the ninety-day removal
period when it appears that an alien cannot be removed in the
"reasonably foreseeable future" is unjustified. The court of appeals's
decision is contrary to the text of § 1231 (a)(6), the structure of the INA,
and the legislative and statutory history of the IIRIRA. Furthermore, the
executive branch's reasonable interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) warrants
judicial deference, and the court's unwarranted intrusion on the executive
branch's reasonable statutory interpretation contradicts the policy
considerations underlying the IIRIRA. By ignoring the plain meaning of
§ 1231 (a)(6), the Ma court has sheltered a constitutional deficiency at the
heart of indefinite detention.
A.

The Ma Court Improperly Construed§ 1231(a)(6)

The Ninth Circuit's construction of § 1231(a)(6) rewrites unambiguous statutory language that has historically permitted the Attorney
General to detain criminal aliens under final orders of removal who
threaten community safety or present a flight risk. Nearly every court
that has interpreted § 1231 (a)(6) has concluded that the plain language of
the statute unambiguously authorizes the Attorney General to detain
beyond the removal period those aliens he or she deems unfit for
release.' 8 ' The court's ruling cannot be reconciled with the congressional
intent manifested in the text of § 1231(a)(6), the structure of the INA,
and the statutory and legislative history of the IIRIRA.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
See supranote 73 and accompanying text.
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The Ninth Circuit's Constructionof§ 1231(a)(6) Conflicts with the
Text of the Statute

The Ninth Circuit's construction of § 1231(a)(6) in Ma cannot be
reconciled with the plain meaning of the statute. The court's interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) conflicts with the literal text of the statute and
creates a requirement not found in the statute's plain language. In
addition, the court's construction fails to give every provision of
§ 1231(a)(6) independent effect and introduces a contradiction into the
statute.
The court's restriction on indefinite detention fails to recognize the
plain language of the statute. Although § 1231(a)(6) does not use the
language of "indefinite detention," the statute contemplates the prospect
of indefinite detention by the use of the phrase "may be detained beyond
the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [supervision].' ' 2
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have concluded that § 123 l(a)(6)'s "may be
detained beyond the removal period" language places no time limit on
the Attorney General's detention authority and unambiguously authorizes detention beyond the removal period.'83 Moreover, because "if' is
defined as "in the event that,"' 84 the statute considers release from
detention an alternative that may not occur. Indeed, the detention power
is only qualified by the twin considerations of community safety and
flight risk.' In contrast to the plain language, the Ma court's interpretation requires removal within the "reasonably foreseeable future,"
and thereby ignores the substantial discretion that Congress vested in the
Attorney General. The fact that such discretion poses a risk of
constitutional violation suggests a problem with the statute itself, not
merely with the way in which it might be read.
By reading an implicit limitation into the Attorney General's detention
authority, the Ma court violated the U.S. Supreme Court's warning not to
create statutory requirements that do not appear in the plain language of
the statute. 86 As written, § 1231(a)(6) does not place a limit on the
length of time beyond the removal period that aliens may be detained.
Instead, § 1231(a)(6) commits to the Attorney General's discretion the
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) (Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
183. Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1057 (10th Cir. 2000); Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185
F.3d 279, 287, 297 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000).
184. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 576 (10th ed. 1993).

185. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
186. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997).
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decision to continue detention beyond the removal period.187 The Ma
court, however, created a new requirement that limits the Attorney
General's discretion and requires release when there is a reasonable
likelihood that an alien will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.'88 Congress, however, specified that the exercise of this discretion
should be guided only by concerns for community safety and flight risk.
As a result, the Ma holding creates considerable tension with the text of
§ 123 1(a)(6) by adding words to the statute that do not appear on its face.
The Ninth Circuit's statutory interpretation also violates the longstanding rule that courts should seek to give every statutory provision
independent effect.'89 First, § 1231(a)(6) provides that those aliens who
have not been removed during the removal period and who the Attorney
General determines pose a community danger or flight risk "may be
detained beyond the removal period."' 90 By ordering the release of aliens
who cannot be removed in the "reasonably foreseeable future," the Ma
decision abrogates this explicit authorization for the Attorney General to
detain beyond the removal period. Second, § 123 1(a)(6) commands that
"ifreleased, [those aliens not yet removed] shall be subject" to
supervision.91 Once again, however, the Ma decision denies the
independent effect of "if released" by rewriting the statute to read "when
released." The Ma court's statutory interpretation controverts the longstanding principle that statutory construction should not render any
statutory word superfluous.
By stretching § 1231(a)(6) beyond its plain meaning, the Ma court
introduced a contradiction into the statutory scheme. On the one hand,
the Ma court recognized the Attorney General's statutory authority to
detain an alien during the ninety-day statutory removal period, but on the
other hand Ma requires release from detention when removal is not on
the foreseeable horizon. A contradiction left unexplained in the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning is why detention is permitted at all in the case of an
alien whose removal is not likely in the "reasonably foreseeable future."
Why should an alien who is ordered removed be subject to the
mandatory ninety-day detention if there is not a repatriation agreement in
place and at the end of the removal period release will be required? For
187. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Part II.D.
188. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir.), cert.granted,121 S.Ct. 297 (Oct. 10,

2000).
189. See supra Part III.D.
190. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
191. Id. (emphasis added).
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the class of aliens who cannot be removed in the "reasonably foreseeable
future," the Ninth Circuit's decision appears to transform the ninety-day
removal period into nothing more than detention for detention's sake.
Such a punitive transformation of the removal period is clearly contrary
to the statutory scheme's proposition that immigration detention is not
punishment but is instead an administrative incident to deportation
proceedings.9 2 Furthermore, this punitive transformation of the removal
period contradicts the Ninth Circuit's avowed intention to avoid arbitrary
detention.' The Ninth Circuit failed to explain the incongruous results
of its statutory interpretation.
2.

The Ninth Circuit's Constructionof§ 1231(a)(6) Conflicts with the
Structure of the INA

The Ninth Circuit's construction of § 1231(a)(6) ignores the framework Congress established for carrying out the country's immigration
policies. The enactment of other INA provisions governing detention of
criminal aliens establishes that Congress intended detention, not
mandatory release, to be the general aim of the INA. In carving out an
exception to the Attorney General's detention authority under
§ 1231 (a)(6), the Ma court assumed Congress did not take into account
the prospect that removal may not occur in the reasonably foreseeable
future. 194 This assumption is unfounded. The structure of the INA reveals
Congress's awareness that some countries may refuse to accept the return
of their nationals.
Within the structure of the INA, Congress explicitly recognized the
possibility that some aliens may not be removed during the removal
period. For example, in the subsection immediately following
§ 1231(a)(6), Congress enacted a law that restricts the employment
opportunities of aliens ordered removed.'9 5 Despite this prohibition,
Congress enacted an exception for aliens the Attorney General finds
"cannot be removed due to the refusal of all countries designated by the
alien or under [§ 1231] to receive the alien," or when "the removal of the
196
alien is otherwise impracticable or contrary to the public interest."
Thus, when Congress intended different treatment for this class of aliens,
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 158 (D.R.I. 1999).
Ma, 208 F.3d at 830.
Id. at 827-28.
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(7).
Id.
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it explicitly did so. Accordingly, Congress would have made an exception to § 1231(a)(6) similar to the exception in § 1231(a)(7) if it had
intended to restrict the Attorney General's post-removal-period detention
authority in § 123 1(a)(6) with respect to aliens who cannot be removed
in the "reasonably foreseeable future."
Other sections of the INA reveal Congress's recognition that some
aliens ordered removed will not be returned immediately to their original
country due to the refusal of some countries to accept the return of their
citizens.197 For example, Congress passed transitional rules,' 98 following
enactment of the IIRIRA, that restricted the release of criminal aliens
including those who "cannot be removed because the designated country
of removal will not accept [their return]."' 99 In addition, the IIRIRA
amended a section of the INA authorizing the Secretary of State to
handle the contingency of visa requests from citizens of countries that
"den[y] or unreasonably delay[]" accepting the return of its own
citizens."0 The clear recognition of, and provision for, aliens who cannot
be removed due to another country's refusal to accept the return of its
nationals is evident throughout the INA. If Congress had intended to
make similar exceptions in the post-removal-period context of
§ 1231(a)(6), it would have done so. Although Congress's choice not to
make such exceptions may have created a statute that produces due
process violations, the Ma court should have addressed that choice, not
the one it would have made.
3.

The Ninth Circuit'sConstruction of§ 1231(a)(6) Conflicts with the
Legislative History of the IlRIRA

The Ma decision deviates from explicit legislative history revealing
congressional intent to grant the Attorney General broad discretion to
determine which aliens to detain past the removal period.2 ' Congress's
stated intent for the current statutory regime is to increase detention of
criminal aliens prior to removal. 20 2 Given the explicit legislative purpose

197. See supra Parts II.A & B.
198. IIRIRA § 303(b)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-586 to -587 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (Supp.
V 1999)) (governing pre-final-order detention during two-year period from October 1996 to October

1998).
199.
200.
201.
202

Id.
Id. § 307(d), 110 Stat. 3009-614 (1996) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d) (1994)).
See supra Part lI.B.
H.1L REP. No. 104-879, at 107-09 (1997); see supra Part ll.B.
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in enacting the ITRIRA, the Ma court's contention that Congress
implicitly intended to place time limits on the Attorney General's
detention authority 2 3 is not borne out by the IIRIRA's legislative history.
The Ma court ignored the legislative history demonstrating Congress's
knowledge of the potential for indefinite detention and its chosen course
of action. A central theme to the Ma court's analysis is that if Congress
had intended "indefinite detention" it would have so stated.2"4 The Ma
court ignored the contrary assertion that Congress could just as easily
have limited the Attorney General's detention authority if it so desired.0 5
In fact, the shift from the AEDPA's mandatory detention regime to the
IIRIRA's restoration of discretion to the Attorney General reveals
Congress's awareness and acceptance of the possibility
of prolonged
20 6
detention following post-removal-period detention.
The legislative compromise that spawned the IIRIRA also militates
against the Ma court's brand of judicial activism. The original House
version of the IIRIRA required release of deportable aliens on expiration
of the ninety-day removal period, 0 7 while the Senate version mandated
detention even after the removal period.0 8 Congress compromised on the
post-removal-period detention by committing the detention determination to the Attorney General's discretion.20 9 If Congress had intended to place a definite time limit on the detention of deportable aliens who
cannot be immediately returned to their original country, then it would
have adopted the original House bill. In construing § 1231 (a)(6), the Ma
court renegotiated a legislative compromise.

203. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 828 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10,
2000).
204. Id. at 828 n.25.
205. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1025 (E.D. La. 1997), rev'd sub noma.
185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000).
206. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The Ma court interpreted the transition from
the AEDPA's mandatory-detention language to the IIRIRA's permissive-detention language as
evidence of Congress's implied intent to restrict the Attorney General's detention authority. Ma, 208
F.3d at 828 n.25.
207. H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 18-19, 25-26, 234 (1996).
208. S. 1664, 104th Cong. § 164 (1996).
209. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 53-54, 215-16 (1996).
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4.

The Ninth Circuit's Construction of§ 1231(a)(6) Conflicts with the
Statutory History of the IIRIRA

Ma's reliance on decisions flowing from the early versions of the INA
is misplaced, as the court overlooked the significance wrought by post1990 INA amendments. In arriving at its interpretation of § 123 1(a)(6),
the Ma Court relied, in part, on an analogy between case law emanating
from the Immigration Act of 1917 and § 1231(a)(6). 21 ° The 1917 Act
simply provided that aliens should be "taken into custody and
deported., 21 ' Courts interpreting the 1917 Act did not make their
reasoning clear; nevertheless, the statute was interpreted as requiring
release from custody if an alien could not be removed within a
reasonable period of time. Courts interpreting subsequent amendments
to the INA established a six-month limit on detention.2 13 Beginning with
the 1990 amendments to the INA, however, Congress clarified that
order of deportation was
detention of aggravated felons following a 2final
14
limit.
six-month
previous
not subject to the
The reliance on case law interpreting the INA's 1917 version is
misplaced because even the Ma court acknowledged that "these older
cases [interpreting the 1917 Act] did not interpret a statute exactly like
[§ 1231(a)(6)]. 215 Section 1231(a)(6) is not subject to earlier limits on
detention and explicitly authorizes detention "beyond the removal
period. 2 16 Indeed, the series of amendments preceding § 1231 (a)(6) have
rejected court-imposed time limits on detention by mandating detention
for criminal aliens.21 7 Given the clear distinction between the language of
the 1917 Act and that of § 1231(a)(6), the court of appeals erred in
drawing support for its interpretation from that line of older Ninth Circuit
cases restricting detention under the 1917 Act to a reasonable time.2 18

210. Ma, 208 F.3d at 828-29.

211. An Act To Regulate the Immigration ofAliens to, and the Residence of Aliens in, the United
States, ch. 29 § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (former 8 U.S.C. § 156 (1917)) (repealed 1952).
212. Ma, 208 F.3d at 829.
213. See, e.g., Oguachuba v. INS, 706 F.2d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1983); Johns v. Dep't of Justice, 653
F.2d 884, 890 (5th Cir. 1981); Castillo-Gradis v. Turnage, 752 F. Supp. 937, 941 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
214. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
215. Ma, 208 F.3d at 829.
216. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1999).
217. See supra Part lI.A. (discussing AEDPA and IIRIRA).
218. See supranote 25 and accompanying text.
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The Ma Court Should Have Deferred to the Attorney General's
Reasonable Interpretationof§ 1231(a)(6)

The Ma court failed to adhere to well-settled principles of judicial
deference, especially in immigration law, toward reasonable executive
branch statutory interpretations.2' 9 In the context of § 1231(a)(6), the
Attorney General has interpreted the statute to authorize the detention of
deportable aliens beyond the removal period without limits. 22 ' The vast
majority of courts that have reviewed the statute have shared the
Attorney General's interpretation. 22 ' The Ninth Circuit, however, has
carved out an exception to the Attorney General's detention authority by
giving the statute a limiting construction.2 Because immigration matters
involve serious questions affecting international relations and foreign
policy, 22 3 a reasonable interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) by the Attorney
General should have been afforded deference. 224 This deference to the
Attorney General's statutory interpretation should have led the court
instead to consider whether this interpretation was constitutional.
The court's decision runs counter to its earlier decisions that refused
to shackle the Attorney General's detention authority.2 25 In refusing to
substitute its judgment for that of the executive, the Ninth Circuit
previously observed that "[r]eading a time limit on detention [of
excludable aliens] would risk frustrating the government's ability to
control immigration policy and relations with foreign nations. 22 6 The
foreign policy considerations are the same whether the alien is
excludable or deportable. The only difference is whether the alien has
constitutional rights while in the United States.227

219. See supra Part I.C. The Ma court determined that the plenary-power doctrine's
applicability varies on a case-by-case basis and was subject to constitutional restraints. The court
avoided the constitutional question in Ma, yet did not specify which constitutional restraints
precluded the doctrine's application in this case. 208 F.3d at 826 n.24.
220. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 236.1(d)(2)(ii) (2000).
221. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
222. Ma, 208 F.3d at 830.
223. See supra Part I.C.
224. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
226. Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1995).
227. See supra notes 14-I 9 (discussing excludable and deportable aliens).
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The Ma court eschewed the Chevron doctrine, which requires courts
to defer to agency interpretations of statutes. 8 Judicial deference to
administrative interpretations, such as the INS's interpretation of
§ 1231(a)(6), has been consistently employed when the scope of
statutory authority involves reconciling conflicting policy choices that
rest within the specialized knowledge of the agency.' Given such an
explicit guideline for the application of judicial deference to administrative agency statutory interpretation, the Attorney General's and INS's
interpretation should not have been regarded lightly. The Ma court
should have deferred to the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation
of § 123 1(a)(6) and then exposed that interpretation to full constitutional
scrutiny.
C.

The Ma Court's Use of ConstitutionalAvoidance Ignored
Congress s Policy Preferences Containedin § 1231(a)(6) and
Abdicated the Judiciary'sRole ofEnforcing the Constitution

By imposing its judgment over that of the Attorney General, the Ma
court attempted to soften this nation's decidedly harsh immigration
policy. This attempt infiinges on the executive branch's ability to make
foreign policy decisions and usurps Congress's lawmaking authority.
Moreover, this attempt compromised judicial authority in construing the
Constitution. 0 Congress clearly chose detention as a necessary part of
the country's immigration policy. 3 ' The Ma court should have respected
that choice and measured it against the Constitution.
Contrary to the Ma court's characterization of its use of constitutional
avoidance as an exercise of "judicial restraint, ' 2 the court used
constitutional avoidance as a vehicle for its own brand of judicial
activism. Constitutional avoidance cannot be used to reinterpret an
unambiguous statute nor to trample the clear intent of Congress.1 3 Given

228. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. The Ma court found the Chevron doctrine

inapplicable because substantial constitutional questions were raised. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d
815, 821 n.13 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000).
229. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
230. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
231. H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 105-07 (1997).
232. Ma, 208 F.3d at 822.
233. See supra Part III.B.
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the unambiguous text and legislative intent of § 1231(a)(6), the Ma
court's use of constitutional avoidance is untenable. 34
The Ma court should have analyzed § 123 1(a)(6) in the same manner
that it analyzed the detention statute in Barrera-Echavarria.In BarreraEchavarria, the Ninth Circuit refused to read a time limit into the
detention statute for excludable aliens and ruled that indefinite detention
was constitutionally permissible.1 5 This approach preserves both Congress's role in writing the country's immigration laws and the judiciary's
role in deciding the constitutionality of those laws. The Ma court,
however, found § 1231(a)(6) to be ambiguous despite the text and
legislative intent of the statute and invoked the canon of constitutional
avoidance to avoid determining the constitutionality of indefinitely
detaining deportable aliens.236 The Ma court improperly distinguished its
decision from Barrera-Echavarriabecause § 1231 (a)(6) unambiguously
subjects both deportable and excludable aliens to the same detention
statute. Far from "judicial restraint," this judicial activism compromised
both the legislative and judicial functions.
The Ma court disingenuously evaded the constitutionality of
indefinitely detaining deportable aliens. By reading a reasonable time
limit into § 123 1(a)(6) for deportable aliens, the court's decision permits
"excludable" aliens to be indefinitely detained under Barrera-Echavarria
while carving out an exception for "deportable" aliens.2 37 This result
squarely conflicts with the IIRIRA's unambiguous text that subjects all
aliens ordered removed--"excludable" and "deportable"----to the same
detention provisions of § 1231 (a)(6).238 If Congress intended to provide
disparate treatment of "excludable" and "deportable aliens," then it
presumably would have so specified.23 9 The fact that § 1231(a)(6)'s
application may be harsh is not a license for the Ma court to
disingenuously avoid a constitutional question by rewriting the statute's
plain language. 24 ° As a result of the Ma court's use of constitutional
avoidance, the Attorney General's detention authority under § 1231 (a)(6)
234. Whether § 1231 (a)(6) presents a substantial constitutional question is beyond the scope of
this Note's statutory argument.
235. Barrerra-Echevarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1444-50 (9th Cir. 1995); see also supra notes
121-24 and accompanying text.
236. Ma, 208 F.3d 815 at 821-22.
237. Id. at 825.
238. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
239. See Greenhorn Farms v. Espy, 39 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1994).
240. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985).
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varies depending on whether an excludable or deportable alien is being
detained. The Ma court's statutory interpretation is a disingenuous
attempt to avoid the constitutional question raised in Barrera24 ' and therefore
Echavarria
does not justify the use of constitutional
242
avoidance.
The fact that the court of appeals relied on the canon of constitutional
avoidance is proof that the court lacked textual support for its
interpretation of § 123 1(a)(6). After all, if the text of § 123 1(a)(6) ruled
out the post-removal-period detention at issue in Ma, then the court
appeals could have simply rested its decision on a plain reading of the
statute. Because § 1231(a)(6)'s unambiguous language243 and clear
congressional intene definitively set the boundaries of the scope of the
Attorney General's detention authority, the Ma court incorrectly used the
canon of constitutional avoidance. 45
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 123 1(a)(6) is properly viewed by its lack of limitations on the
length of time the Attorney General may detain removable aliens. Based
on its text, structure, and history, § 123 1(a)(6) contemplates the prospect
of indefinite detention. Indeed, the statute clearly states that the Attorney
General may detain removable aliens beyond the removal period, and "if
released," the alien will be subject to the regulations provided. Given
such unambiguous language, the Ma court's use of constitutional
avoidance is unjustified. Because Congress chose indefinite detention as
a part of the immigration policy of the United States, it was the court's
role to decide the constitutionality of that choice. Ultimately, the Ma
court's interpretation of § 123 1(a)(6) had the effect of a sieve, draining
the statute of its intended meaning by passing it through a porous judicial
authority.
This Note aimed to encourage judicial scrutiny of the grave
consequences of indefinite detention. Lacking an authoritative voice in
court, an alien will be subject to the patchwork caprice of various
241. See supra note 125.
242. See George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933).
243. See supra Part V.A.1.
244. See supra Parts V.A.I-.4.
245. See Miller v. French, 540 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2000) (explaining that courts may not subvert
plain meaning of statute to avoid constitutional questions); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988).
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interpretations of § 1231 (a)(6). Displacing the issue is not a responsible
way to manage such an important aspect of American foreign and
domestic policy. Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Ma, courts confronting the
issue of indefinite detention should refuse the cloak of constitutional
avoidance and confront indefinite-detention statutes head-on.

